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Between War and Peace: Exploring the Constitutionality of
Subjecting Private Civilian Contractors to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice During "Contingency Operations'"
"I want to kill somebody today," the voice of Jacob Washbourne
rang out in the armored SUV as he and three fellow private security
contractors sped along Baghdad's airport road.1 Washbourne was the
leader of a team employed by Triple Canopy, a company contracted
by the U.S. government to provide security escorts along dangerous
roads in Iraq.' Although the details of what happened the afternoon
of July 8, 2006, remain unclear,3 by the end of the day Washbourne's
team had engaged in at least two separate shooting incidents.4 One
shooting involved a random local taxicab that they encountered while
speeding along the airport road.5 According to two of his teammates,
Washbourne proclaimed, " 'I've never shot anyone with my pistol
before,' " and then proceeded to "push[] open the armored door,
lean[] out with his handgun and fire[] '7 or 8 rounds' into the taxi's
windshield.",6 The taxi veered off the road erratically, but the team
did not stop to see if anyone was hurt.' Although the shooting
seemed to be reckless and unprovoked, no criminal investigation
ensued.' Instead, it was another confirmation of the motto often
repeated by American security contractors: "What happens here
today, stays here today. '
The Triple Canopy incident is evidence of the struggle to
integrate private contractors into government operations. In the
* Copyright © 2008 by Cara-Ann M. Hamaguchi.
1. Steve Fainaru, A Chaotic Day on Baghdad's Airport Road, WASH. POST, Apr. 15,
2007, at Al. Washbourne made statements such as these on every mission. Id. (noting
that Washbourne "frequently made similar jokes" and said " '[o]kay, let's go shoot
somebody' "prior to each mission).
2. Id.
3. Id. ("The full story of what happened on Baghdad's airport road that day may
never be known.").
4. Id.
5. Id. Another incident involved a white pickup truck that the team encountered on
their way to the airport. Id. While there are conflicting versions of the incident, two
members of the team said, "it was Washbourne who shot at the white truck and that he
fired intentionally into the windshield." Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. Id.
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context of the Global War on Terrorism and modern
counterinsurgency operations, 10 the Department of Defense and
other agencies within the U.S. government utilize an unprecedented
number of private contractors to support missions in Iraq and
Afghanistan."1 These contractors are vital to counterinsurgency
efforts because they augment force limitations by performing services
ranging from logistics support to security functions.12 However,
unlike members of the Armed Forces who are "accountable under
[the Uniform Code of Military Justice] wherever they are located,"13
private security contractors fall into "legal 'gray areas' " between
host-nation laws, domestic criminal laws, and international laws such
as the Geneva Convention. 4 As civilians, they would normally be
subject to host-nation laws. 5 In Iraq and Afghanistan, however,
contractors are expressly protected by agreements providing
immunity from prosecution in the local jurisdiction. 6 In addition,
10. Counterinsurgency operations are defined as "military, paramilitary, political,
economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency,"
THE U.S. ARMY/MARINE CORPS COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL 383 (2007)
[hereinafter COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL], and are descriptive of the mission
of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan.
11. See id. at 65 ("Recently, private contractors from firms providing military-related
services have become more prominent in theaters of operations."); P.W. Singer,
Outsourcing War: Understanding the Private Military Industry, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr.
2005, at 123 (commenting that private military firms "have been essential to the U.S. effort
in Iraq"). See generally John M. Broder & David Rohde, State Department Use of
Contractors Leaps in 4 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at Al (reporting that the State
Department spends nearly $4 billion annually on private security and law enforcement
contractors such as Blackwater USA and DynCorp International).
12. CTR. FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, FORGED IN THE FIRE: LEGAL
LESSONS LEARNED DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS 1994-2006, at 26 (2006)
[hereinafter FORGED IN THE FIRE] ("The Department of Defense uses contractors to
provide U.S. forces that are deployed overseas with a wide variety of services because of
force limitations and a lack of needed skills."); see JENNIFER ELSEA & NINA M.
SERAFINO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ:
BACKGROUND, LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 1 (2004), http://assets.opencrs.com/
rpts/RL32419 20040528.pdf ("[T]he United States has gradually increased the types of
tasks and roles for which it contracts private companies in military operations . .
13. Singer, supra note 11, at 127.
14. Lauren Stone, "Understanding the Privatization of National Security" Conference
Executive Summary, A.B.A. NAT'L SECURITY L. REP., Nov. 2006, at 11, 13; Singer, supra
note 11, at 127 ("[C]ontractors have a murky legal status.").
15. See COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 10, at 357.
16. See, e.g., COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER No. 17 (REVISED),
STATUS OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, MNF-IRAQ, CERTAIN MISSIONS
AND PERSONNEL IN IRAQ 5 (2004), http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040627-
CPAORD-17_Status ofCoalitionRevwithAnnexA.pdf. This order was signed by
L. Paul Bremer during his tenure as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority and
provides that "[c]ontractors shall be immune from [the] Iraqi legal process." Id.
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although Congress passed the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act ("MEJA")17 to hold civilians accountable under domestic
criminal laws, 8 MEJA has not been widely utilized due to significant
resource limitations. 9 Finally, contractors do not "fit the formal
definition of mercenaries" and are thus "undefined by international
law.,
20
Recognizing the need to close this legal loophole,2' Senator
Lindsey Graham proposed the addition of section 552 to the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
("FY07 NDAA"). 22 This addition expanded the jurisdiction of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") to hold civilians
"accompanying the force" accountable to military laws during
"contingency operation[s]. 23 Prior to section 552, the jurisdiction of
the UCMJ could only be extended to these civilians in "time[s] of
war," 24 which has been interpreted by the military's highest court to
17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67 (2000).
18. Id. § 3261(a)(1).
19. These limitations are due to factors such as "remoteness of the crime scene; issues
arising out of combat operations in finding witnesses, victims, and evidence; and cultural
prohibitions on autopsies." Anthony E. Giardino, Using Extraterritorial Jurisdiction To
Prosecute Violations of the Law of War: Looking Beyond the War Crimes Act, 48 B.C. L.
REV. 699, 731 (2007); see also Peter W. Singer, Brookings Inst., Frequently Asked
Questions on the UCMJ Change and its Applicability to Private Military Contractors,
Jan. 12, 2007, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0112defenseindustry-singer.aspx
(explaining that using MEJA to prosecute civilians for crimes in Iraq would require a U.S.
Attorney to travel to Iraq several times and possibly spend "his entire yearly budget on
one case" while trying to balance ongoing domestic prosecutions).
20. Singer, supra note 11, at 127. See generally ELSEA & SERAFINO, supra note 12, at
9-11 (examining the definition of mercenary under Article 47 of Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions and concluding that "some of... [its] requirements are inherently difficult to
prove"). Although "[t]he United States has not ratified Protocol I_ .. some of its
provisions may be considered binding as customary international law." Id. at 10 n.37.
21. See William Matthews, Some UCMJ Rules Now Cover U.S. Contractors, MARINE
CORPS TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007, available at http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/01/
dfn.ucmjcontractors070105/ (reporting that the change was "intended to close a legal
loophole that has enabled contract personnel to escape punishment for violating the law").
22. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217. Notably, there are no records of debates leading
up to the legislative change because section 552 was a "little noticed" provision that was
added to "the FY07 NDAA at the last minute." Civilians Accompanying Forces in the
Field Now Subject to U.S. Military Justice, GOV'T CONT. ADVISORY (McKenna Long &
Aldridge L.L.P., D.C.), Jan. 29, 2007, at 1, http://www.mckennalong.com/attachment1570/
GC+Advisory+1-29-07+UCMJ+Jurisdiction.pdf [hereinafter Civilians Accompanying
Forces].
23. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 120 Stat.
2083, 2217 (2007).
24. Id. (emphasis added).
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mean a declared war." Since Congress has not officially declared war
since World War 11,26 civilians serving in Iraq and Afghanistan were
previously immune from prosecution under the UCMJ.27 Section 552
amended 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10), expanding the jurisdiction of the
UCMJ to cover civilians in "time[s] of declared war or a contingency
operation.' '18  Because the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are both
contingency operations,29 the addition effectively subjects civilians
accompanying the force, including private contractors, to the UCMJ.3°
In essence, "100,000 contractors woke up to find themselves
potentially under the same set of military laws that govern the armed
forces."31
While perhaps well intended, section 552 raises many questions.32
One of the most important questions concerns the constitutionality of
section 552. On one hand, numerous federal court decisions have
upheld military convictions of civilians accompanying the force during
25. See United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (1970) ("We conclude that the
words 'in time of war' mean.., a war formally declared by Congress.").
26. See FORGED IN THE FIRE, supra note 12, at 31 ("[T]here has not been a declared
war since World War II.").
27. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 5525.11: CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
OVER CIVILIANS EMPLOYED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, CERTAIN SERVICE
MEMBERS, AND FORMER SERVICE MEMBERS § 2.4 (2005), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/
directives/corres/pdf/552511p.pdf ("[C]ivilians are generally not subject to prosecution
under the UCMJ, unless Congress ha[s] declared a 'time of war' when the acts were
committed."); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REBUILDING IRAQ: ACTIONS
STILL NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE USE OF PRIVATE SECURITY PROVIDERS 6 (2006),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06865t.pdf ("[P]rivate security providers are
generally not subject to prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice in the
absence of a formal declaration of war by Congress.").
28. 10 U.S.C.A. § 802(a)(10) (2007) (emphasis added).
29. A contingency operation is "designated by the Secretary of Defense" and defined
as "an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in
military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States." 10
U.S.C. § 101(a)(13)(A) (2000). Alternatively, it can also be an operation in which reserve-
component members are called to active status "during a war or during a national
emergency declared by the President or Congress." § 101(a)(13)(B).
30. Civilians "accompanying the force" is a broad term that potentially encompasses
civilians employed by the government, private contractors, and even dependents. See
Singer, supra note 19 ("On the whole, there are all sorts of theories as to whether it will
apply to only direct Defense Department contractors or those from other agencies
working in the same warzones or to 3rd party nationals."). While there are certainly
constitutional concerns regarding applicability to each of these groups, this Recent
Development will focus on private contractors.
31. Singer, supra note 19.
32. See, e.g., id. ("[K]ey controversies are the scope and depth of its interpretation.
That is, who does it apply to and for what issues?").
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times of declared war.33 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has
declared that subjecting civilians to the UCMJ in peacetime is
unconstitutional.' As such, the question of whether the UCMJ can
be constitutionally applied to civilian contractors during contingency
operations, which fall between war and peace, remains unanswered.
This Recent Development will argue that, although there are
significant due process barriers to constitutionality, these concerns do
not completely rule out the possibility of applying the UCMJ to
civilian contractors accompanying the force in contingency
operations.
To support this argument, this Recent Development will analyze
Reid v. Covert,35 which is the seminal case addressing UCMJ
jurisdiction over civilians. First, it will argue that the Reid decision,
which held that subjecting civilian spouses of servicemen to the
UCMJ is unconstitutional, can be distinguished from section 552.
Next, this Recent Development will use the analytical framework
established in Reid to evaluate the constitutionality of section 552. In
Reid, Justice Black based his opinion on two grounds: (1) due process
rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and (2) Congress's
authority to regulate the "land and naval Forces" under Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution.36 Likewise, this Recent Development
will consider whether the UCMJ will afford civilians adequate due
process rights, as well as whether Congress's power over "land and
naval Forces" applies to civilian contractors in contingency
operations. Finally, this Recent Development will conclude by noting
33. See, e.g., In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252, 254 (S.D. Ohio 1944) (finding that a civilian
merchant seaman accompanying the Army during a declared war was subject to a court-
martial); McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80, 89 (E.D. Va. 1943) (denying application for
writ of habeas corpus to a civilian cook onboard a vessel used to transport troops and
supplies); In re Di Bartolo, 50 F. Supp. 929, 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (finding as proper courts-
martial jurisdiction over a civilian employee of an aircraft company in a combat zone
during a declared war).
34. See McElroy v. United States, 361 U.S. 281, 284 (1960) (" 'That a civilian ...
cannot legally be made liable to the military law and jurisdiction, in time of peace, is a
fundamental principle of our public law.'" (quoting 1 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY
LAW AND PRECEDENTS 127 (2d ed. 1896))).
35. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Reid combines the cases of two civilian wives of service
members who were each convicted of murder under the UCMJ. See id. at 3-4. First,
"Mrs. Clarice Covert killed her husband, a sergeant in the United States Air Force, at an
airbase in England." Id. at 3. In an unrelated incident, "Mrs. Dorothy Smith killed her
husband, an Army officer, at a post in Japan where she was living with him." Id. at 4.
These cases were "particularly significant because [they were] the first time since the
adoption of the Constitution [that] wives of soldiers [had] been denied trial by jury in a
court of law and forced to trial before courts-martial." Id. at 3.
36. Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that despite due process shortcomings, dicta in Reid suggest that
Congress's authority under Article I, Section 8 may uphold the
constitutionality of section 552.
The most fundamental distinction between Reid and section 552
is that each implicates a different source of jurisdictional authority.
The jurisdictional authority of the UCMJ is codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 802(a), which explicitly specifies categories of persons subject to the
UCMJ.37 These categories range from "[m]embers of a regular
component of the armed forces" in § 802(a)(1) to "[1]awful enemy
combatants" under § 802(a)(13).38 Whereas section 552 amends
§ 802(a)(10) to confer authority over "persons serving with or
accompanying an armed force in the field" in either a "declared war
or a contingency operation,, 39 Reid was based on an entirely separate
provision: § 802(a)(11).4° As such, while the Reid decision narrowly
rendered § 802(a)(11) unconstitutional,41 it is not necessarily binding
on the constitutionality of subjecting a civilian to the UCMJ under
§ 802(a)(10). In fact, Justice Black carefully distinguished the two
provisions in Reid and emphasized that § 802(a)(10) was not at
issue." This intentional separation leaves open the possibility that
prosecuting civilians under § 802(a)(10) may be constitutional.
Furthermore, Reid was only a plurality decision. Of the eight Justices
participating,43 four were in the plurality, two concurred separately in
37. 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2000) ("Art. 2. Persons subject to this chapter"). Article 2 of the
UCMJ corresponds with parallel provisions in 10 U.S.C. § 802. For example, Article
2(a)(5) is identical to 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(5).
38. 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 802(a)(1)-(13) (2007). Examples of other persons subject to the
UCMJ include cadets at service academies, "[r]etired members of a regular component of
the armed forces who are entitled to pay," and "prisoners of war in custody of the armed
forces." Id.
39. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083,
2217 (2007).
40. Reid, 354 U.S. at 3 ("The court-martial asserted jurisdiction over [the defendant]
under Article 2(11) of the UCMJ ...."). This provision broadly covers "persons serving
with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States ... [and
its territories]." § 802(a)(11).
41. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES R.C.M. 202(a)(4) (2005)
("The exercise of jurisdiction under Article 2(a)(11) in peacetime has been held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States." (emphasis added)).
42. Reid, 354 U.S. at 34 n.61 ("We believe that Art. 2(10) sets forth the maximum
historically recognized extent of military jurisdiction over civilians .... The Government
does not attempt-and quite appropriately so-to support military jurisdiction over [the
defendants] under Art. 2(10).").
43. Id. at 41 ("Mr. Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of
these cases.").
1052 [Vol. 86
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result only, and two dissented.' Therefore, the plurality opinion in
Reid is far from the final word on UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians.
Nevertheless, it provides an analytical framework for considering the
constitutionality of section 552.45 The due process concerns and the
scope of Congress's Article I, Section 8 authority are just as relevant
for private contractors as they were for the civilian spouses in Reid.
Turning first to a due process analysis, the U.S. Constitution
mandates specific procedural requirements for criminal prosecutions,
which serve the core function of safeguarding defendants' rights.'
These provisions, elaborated in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments, set the constitutional floor for our criminal justice
system and are reflected in the federal judicial system through the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Evidence.47 However, military courts-known as courts-martial-are
not bound by federal court rules because the military system is
distinct from the federal system. Whereas federal courts fall under
Article III of the Constitution, the authority for courts-martial comes
from Article 1.48 Under Article I, Section 8, Congress has the power
"[t]o raise and support Armies," "provide and maintain a Navy," and
"provide for organizing ... and disciplining them."4 9  Because
"Congress'[s] power '[t]o Make Rules for the Government and
44. Justice Black, Chief Justice Warren, Justice Douglas, and Justice Brennan were in
the plurality, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred in result only with separate
opinions, and Justices Clark and Burton dissented. Id. As a side note, "the Court first
ruled against [the defendant], but, upon petition for reconsideration, Mr. Justice Harlan
changed his position, thus paving the way for a reversal of the conviction." Walter T. Cox
III, The Army, the Courts, and the Constitution: The Evolution of Military Justice, 118
MIL. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1987).
45. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1976) ("When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds ....... (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))).
46. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 10 ("These elemental procedural safeguards were embedded
in our Constitution to secure their inviolateness and sanctity against the passing demands
of expediency or convenience.").
47. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SELECTED PROCEDURAL
SAFEGUARDS IN FEDERAL, MILITARY, AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 3 (2006),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31262.pdf.
48. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MILITARY COURTS-MARTIAL:
AN OVERVIEW 1 (2005), http://www.house.gov/delahunt/hutchinscrs.pdf. Under the
UCMJ, there are also nonjudicial administrative forms of punishment for lesser crimes, as
well as lesser degrees of courts-martial. See 10 U.S.C. § 815 (2000) (nonjudicial
punishment); id. § 819 (special courts-martial); id. § 820 (summary courts-martial).
However, this Recent Development will only address general courts-martial.
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).
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Regulation of the land and naval Forces' is entirely separate from
Article III,"5° the UCMJ has unique rules that govern criminal
procedure.
The Rules for Courts-Martial ("R.C.M.") and the Military Rules
of Evidence guide proceedings in the military justice system and
generally "mirror those in the federal criminal justice system."51 For
example, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the R.C.M.
both demand a presumption of a defendant's innocence,52 held by the
Supreme Court to "lie[] at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law."53 In addition, both federal courts and courts-martial
protect a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.54 Other commonalities between the federal and
military systems include the attorney-client privilege, the protection
against double jeopardy, and the burden of proving a defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.5  Despite these similarities,
however, there are two major procedural differences between federal
and military courts: pretrial investigations and the jury system.56
These differences are the specific areas on which the Reid plurality
focused. In the five decades since Reid was decided, however, the
military justice system has evolved significantly and now affords
defendants many more rights.58 In light of these changes, the UCMJ's
pretrial investigations and jury system warrant further consideration.
50. ELSEA, supra note 47, at 3 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 14).
51. Civilians Accompanying Forces, supra note 22, at 4.
52. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES
R.C.M. 910(b) (2005). These provisions contain identical wording.
53. ELSEA, supra note 47, at 11 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453
(1895)).
54. See id. at 26; U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself ... .
55. See ELSEA, supra note 47, at 15, 21, 25.
56. There are also several less significant differences, such as the exact wording of the
Miranda warnings and pretrial release procedures. See generally Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452 (1994) (equating UCMJ warnings with Miranda warnings); Robert Amrine,
Justice Military, Civilian Systems Differ by Comparison, HILLTOP TIMES, Apr. 25, 2002,
http://hilltop.standard.net/story.asp?edition=50&storyid=1229 (noting that the military has
no system of bail and that, unless pretrial confinement is ordered, those accused are "free
on their own recognizance").
57. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 22 (1957) ("[Tlhe Fifth and Sixth Amendments require
that certain express safeguards, which were designed to protect persons from oppressive
governmental practices, shall be given in criminal prosecutions-safeguards which cannot
be given in a military trial.").
58. See James B. Roan & Cynthia Buxton, The Military Justice System in the New
Millennium, 52 A.F. L. REV. 105, 185-86 (2002) ("[T]he American military justice system
Vol. 861054
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Looking first at pretrial investigations, the Fifth Amendment
demands that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces."59 The
federal criminal system requires grand jury investigations, while the
military system is explicitly exempt from this requirement.6°
Nevertheless, the military system utilizes pretrial investigations in the
form of Article 32 investigations.6' Although Article 32 investigations
and grand jury proceedings share the similar goal of "ensur[ing] that
there is a basis for prosecution, 62 there are stark differences between
the two in practice. Grand jury investigations are secret proceedings
in which neither the accused nor his counsel are entitled to be
present.63 In contrast, Article 32 investigations are generally public
and permit the accused to examine evidence presented against him,
cross-examine all government witnesses, and offer evidence on his
own behalf.64 Thus, given that the objective of procedural protections
is to safeguard individual rights, subjecting private contractors to
Article 32 investigations in lieu of grand jury proceedings is likely
constitutional. Civilian contractors prosecuted under the UCMJ
would actually enjoy more rights in an Article 32 investigation than in
a grand jury proceeding under the federal criminal system. Notably,
the fact that Article 32 investigations are similar to the pretrial
investigations utilized by many states is further evidence that Article
32 investigations meet procedural due process standards.65
The second significant difference between federal and military
criminal procedure concerns the right to an impartial jury.
Specifically, the Sixth Amendment provides that an accused has a
right to "an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
is not static or outdated; it is dynamic and evolving. It incorporates the fundamental
protections offered to all United States citizens and, in many ways, exceeds them.").
59. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
60. Notably, the text also provides an exception for "[m]ilitia, when in actual service
in time of War or public danger." Id. However, this exception does not apply to the issue
at hand. Assuming arguendo that civilian contractors are classified as militia, this textual
exception is limited to times of war, not contingency operations. See id.
61. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2000).
62. ELSEA, supra note 48, at 5.
63. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.
64. § 832.
65. The right to a grand jury is not so fundamental that it is incorporated against the
states in the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 537-38 (1884). In addition, the pretrial investigations utilized by many states are also
not constitutionally required. See Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 589 (1913).
2008] 1055
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shall have been committed. ' 66  This requirement is also well
established by precedent as a fundamental right.67 In Reid, Justice
Black noted that "[t]rial by jury in a court of law and in accordance
with traditional modes of procedure ... has served and remains one
of our most vital barriers to governmental arbitrariness.,
68
Addressing courts-martial directly, Justice Black also warned that
"[e]very extension of military jurisdiction is an encroachment on the
jurisdiction of the civil courts ... [that] acts as a deprivation of the
right to jury trial and of other treasured constitutional protections."69
Determining whether or not courts-martial satisfy the requirement
for an impartial jury as applied to civilian contractors requires an
inquiry into the procedural rules governing jury composition under
the UCMJ, as well as consideration of the fair "impartial jury"
standard.
First, although the text of the Sixth Amendment does not offer
explicit guidance for specific jury composition practices, a long line of
Supreme Court precedent dictates minimum procedural
requirements. With regard to the number of jurors required for a
trial jury, the R.C.M. fails to meet established standards. The R.C.M.
requires that general courts-martial are comprised of "not less than
five members."7 However, the Supreme Court specifically held that
five jurors were too few in Ballew v. Georgia.7 Although the R.C.M.
increases the number of members to twelve for capital cases in most
circumstances,72 the constitutional minimum established in case law
applies to all trials, capital and noncapital as well.73 This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that unlike the federal system, the military
system does not require a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant
66. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1995) ("The Constitution
gives a criminal defendant the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt,
his guilt of every element of the crime with which he is charged.").
68. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10 (1957).
69. Id. at 21. The "other treasured constitutional protection[]" that Justice Black
primarily refers to is the right to a grand jury hearing, see id. at 10, which is discussed
above, see supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
70. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES R.C.M. 501(a)(1)(A) (2005).
In the military, individuals who sit on jury panels are called "members." See ELSEA, supra
note 48, at 4 n.29 ("Members in the military justice system are the equivalent of jurors
71. 435 U.S. 223, 228 (1978).
72. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES R.C.M. 501(a)(1)(B). This
increase for capital cases is not a set requirement. In exigent circumstances, "[i]f 12
members are not reasonably available, the convening authority [can set the number of
members] under 12, but... [no] fewer than five." Id.
73. In Ballew, the petitioner had been convicted of a misdemeanor. 435 U.S. at 225.
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of a noncapital crime.74 While unanimity alone is not a constitutional
requirement,75 when coupled with the fact that the military system
only requires a minimum of five members, the threshold for
conviction with a jury verdict is much lower than is constitutionally
permissible according to case law. In essence, the concurrence of just
four individuals on a five-member panel would be sufficient to convict
a defendant and impose a life sentence under the UCMJ. This aspect
of jury composition in the military system represents the biggest
procedural hurdle in assessing the constitutionality of section 552.
Turning to the second inquiry, the impartiality requirement
implicates individual jurors as well as the jury venire.76 In both
federal and military courts, impartiality of individual jurors is
achieved through the voir dire process.77 Potentially unfair or biased
jurors-as determined through examination-can be dismissed for
cause or through peremptory challenges.78 In this regard, the military
system parallels its federal counterpart. However, it differs vastly
with respect to jury venire requirements. Unlike the federal system,
the military justice system requires that all courts-martial members be
"on active duty with the armed forces."79  Because precedent
demands that juries represent a fair cross section of the community, 80
the constitutionality of the issue at hand turns on whether a jury
comprised of all active duty members is diverse enough to ensure an
impartial jury to civilian contractors.
74. 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(2) (2000) (requiring the "concurrence of two-thirds of the
members present at the time the vote is taken" for conviction). Sentencing verdicts, with
the exception of capital sentences, also do not require unanimity. Id. § 852(b) (requiring
"concurrence of three-fourths of the members" for sentences exceeding ten years of
confinement and "concurrence of two-thirds of the members" for all other noncapital
sentences).
75. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1972) (holding that, although
history and precedent require verdicts to be unanimous in federal court, a unanimous
verdict is not a fundamental right incorporated to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359 (1972)
("[The] Court has never held jury unanimity to be a requisite of due process of law.").
76. See generally MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES AND PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: THE COURT ROOM 406 (4th ed. 2004) (explaining that the jury selection
process will ensure an "impartial" jury).
77. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES
R.C.M. 912 (2005).
78. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES R.C.M. 912(f), (g).
79. Id. R.C.M. 502(a)(1). An enlisted defendant may request a panel of at least one-
third enlisted members. Id. R.C.M. 503(a)(2).
80. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("We accept the fair-cross-section
requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and are
convinced that the requirement has solid foundation.").
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Arguably, one scholar's hypothesis that "[m]ost soldiers ... have
a deeply ambivalent attitude toward [private military firms]" is a
strong indication that civilian contractors would not get a fair verdict
in a court-martial.81 This attitude toward contractors is attributed to
several factors. First, many private firms recruit from within the
military itself, thereby robbing the military of quality soldiers with
valuable training." Second, "the military's professional identity and
monopoly on certain activities is being encroached on by the regular
civilian marketplace. '83 The very fact that civilians have been in a
legal criminal loophole for so long could also be a source of
ambivalence, as soldiers are accustomed to adhering to both
international laws of warfare and the UCMJ. If these biases do
indeed exist, subjecting a private military contractor to a court-
martial comprised of all active duty members could be seen as partial
and, therefore, unfair and unconstitutional.
On the other hand, there are also arguments to support the
notion that active duty members would satisfy the constitutional
requirement for an impartial jury. The Sixth Amendment demands a
jury "of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed."' In United States v. Cores,85 the Supreme Court noted
that this provision serves as a "safeguard against the unfairness and
hardship involved when an accused is prosecuted in a remote place."86
Arguably, while the specific mission of private contractors and
members of the armed forces may differ, their overall purposes and
experiences have much in common. The unique environment in
which they operate can be a unifying factor in favor of fairness. For
example, the justification for many of the alleged shootings involving
private contractors in Iraq has been self-defense.87 Who better to
81. Singer, supra note 11, at 128.
82. Id.
83. Id. (acknowledging the trend of hiring civilian contractors to perform jobs that
were once exclusive to the military). For example, whereas infantry units or military
police would traditionally guard convoys, this job is often outsourced to contractors. See
Steve Fainaru, Iraq Contractors Face Growing Parallel War, WASH. POST, June 16, 2007,
at Al (reporting that "[t]he security industry's enormous growth has been facilitated by
the U.S. military, which uses ... 20,000 to 30,000 contractors to offset chronic troop
shortages ... [and perform jobs such as] protect[ing] all convoys transporting
reconstruction materiel").
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
85. 356 U.S. 405 (1958).
86. Id. at 407.
87. See, e.g., Fainaru, supra note 1 (reporting that a Triple Canopy employee's reason
for shooting "more than a dozen rounds into ... [an] oncoming truck with his M-4 [and]
wounding the driver" was because "he felt threatened"); Jim Michaels, Blackwater
Firefight Leads Iraq To Look Closer at Contractors, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2007, at 8A
1058 [Vol. 86
2008] BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE 1059
understand the circumstances behind their actions in a combat
environment than a panel of military personnel who have potentially
been under hostile fire themselves? The counterinsurgency operation
in Iraq is not solely a military effort, and it "requires synchronizing
the efforts of many non-military .. . agencies in a comprehensive
approach."88  The common experiences and unified focus of
contractors and military personnel could serve to neutralize any bias
against contractors. Additionally, the wide diversity within the
military further serves to ensure an impartial verdict for contractors.
Men and women in the armed forces represent every state and
territory in the United States, and have varied ethnicities, age groups,
and upbringings."
As a final note on procedural rights, the military justice system
has evolved significantly since 1957, when Reid was decided.90 For
example, President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration passed the
Military Justice Act of 1968,91 which implemented major changes such
as the "designation of a 'military judge' to preside over ... court-
martial proceedings,"92 and also allowed for "trial by a 'military judge
alone' upon request of the accused." 93 The most significant change,
however, is the modern "existence of the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces."94 This court was created to be "completely removed
(reporting that Blackwater's involvement in the September 2007 shooting were actions in
self-defense and that Blackwater merely returned defensive fire).
88. COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 10, at 51-52.
89. See, e.g., BETrY D. MAXFIELD, OFFICE OF ARMY DEMOGRAPHICS, ARMY
PROFILE 3-6 (2005) (reporting demographic data for the U.S. Army); see also TIM KANE,
THE HERITAGE CTR. FOR DATA ANALYSIS, WHO BEARS THE BURDEN?
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. MILITARY RECRUITS BEFORE AND AFTER
9/11, at 13-14 (2007), http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/upload/
955121.pdf (reporting state and territory data for military recruits). For demographic
data for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, see Army G-1
Demographics, http://www.armygl.army.mil/hr/demographics.asp (last visited Mar. 30,
2008).
90. Civilians Accompanying Forces, supra note 22, at 2 (noting that there are "more
procedural protections in place today under the UCMJ than there were 40 years ago"); see
also Cox, supra note 44, at 18 ("The system has continued to change and evolve into a
modern, generally efficient, system which tries to serve the delicate balance between the
needs of the commander to have an expedient method of administering punishment for
serious breaches of the law and the rights of an accused to a fair and impartial trial.").
91. Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-29, 859-76 (2000)).
92. Cox, supra note 44, at 19 (citing the Military Justice Act of 1968).
93. Id. (citing the Military Justice Act of 1968).
94. Civilians Accompanying Forces, supra note 22, at 2. Although the court was
actually commenced in 1951, it has undergone several changes since its inception, and
today it is an important safeguard in the military system. See generally JONATHAN LURIE,
MILITARY JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED
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from all military influence of persuasion"95 and "is composed of five
civilian judges. 9 6 In addition, all cases decided by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces are eligible for direct appeal to the
Supreme Court,97 and appellants are permitted representation by
civilian counsel.9" The safeguards built into the modern Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces, combined with the changes made to
the UCMJ in the fifty years since Reid was decided, could be enough
for the Supreme Court to find adequate procedural protections under
the UCMJ, notwithstanding differences with the federal criminal
system.99
In addition to procedural due process, a significant factor in
assessing the constitutionality of section 552 is substantive due
process. The Court in Reid did not address substantive due process
because the defendant was charged with murder, which is
criminalized in both the federal and military justice systems.
However, in addition to the crimes found concurrently in both
systems, such as murder, rape, and assault,"' the UCMJ also
addresses offenses that are "exclusive to the military."'01 As such, the
issue of section 552's constitutionality depends on whether military-
FORCES, 1775-1980 (2001) (providing a detailed account of the evolution of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces).
95. BROCHURE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED
FORCES 3 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id. at 1 (emphasis added). In addition, "[t]o underscore the civilian nature of the
Court,... a person who has retired from the armed forces after 20 or more years of active
service" is not eligible to be appointed as a judge. Id. at 8.
97. Id. at 5.
98. Id. This is also true of courts-martial. A defendant is provided with military
defense counsel free of charge and may also elect to be represented by defense counsel at
his or her own expense. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES R.C.M.
506(a) (2005).
99. There are also safeguards in the military appellate process prior to reaching the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Under the UCMJ, all courts-martial convictions
carrying a sentence of one year or more are automatically appealed to the Court of
Criminal Appeals of the appropriate service branch. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL UNITED STATES R.C.M. 1201(a) (2005). In reviewing these cases, Courts of
Criminal Appeals "may weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and
determine controverted questions of fact, recognizing that the court-martial saw and heard
the evidence." Id. R.C.M. 1203 discussion of section (b) (emphasis added). Whereas
other appellate courts can only review questions of law, Courts of Criminal Appeals can
review questions of both law and fact. This unique feature of the UCMJ is another
safeguard against potential due process violations in military jury composition.
100. See 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2000) (murder); id. § 920 (rape); id. § 928 (assault). Both
systems impose similar punishments for these offenses. See ELSEA, supra note 48, at 3
(finding that potential punishment imposed by the UCMJ generally matches that available
for "the corresponding civilian offense").
101. ELSEA, supra note 48, at 2.
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specific laws can be applied to contractors without violating their
substantive due process rights.
Examples of offenses unique to the military justice system
include articles prohibiting sodomy 2 and failure to obey orders.'0 3
The military also imposes exclusive restrictions on service members
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, which include prohibitions against
alcohol and pornography."°  In addition, the UCMJ contains a
general article that covers "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice
of good order and discipline in the armed forces, [and] all conduct of
a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces."'15 While some
UCMJ-specific offenses only apply to "member[s] of the armed
forces,"'16 most of them apply generally to "person[s] subject to [the
UCMJ]"'' 7 and must therefore be addressed.
Concededly, some military-specific laws in the UCMJ appear to
be unconstitutional as applied to civilian contractors. The UCMJ's
prohibition against sodomy,0 8 for example, directly conflicts with the
Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas. °9 Limiting the scope
of the UCMJ as applied to civilian contractors, however, is a remedy
that would preserve the constitutionality of section 552. This could be
achieved by enforcing only certain UCMJ-specific offenses. In fact,
section 552 was never intended to prosecute minor infractions. 10 A
spokesman for Senator Graham commented that the legislative
purpose behind section 552 was to " 'give [military commanders] a
102. 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2000).
103. Id. § 892.
104. HEADQUARTERS MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ, GENERAL ORDER NUMBER
1 (GO-I), at 1-2 (2006) [hereinafter GENERAL ORDER 1]. Incidentally, some private
military firms have their own bars in Iraq, which would clearly be a violation of General
Order 1 if it were enforced against contractors. See Fainaru, supra note 1 ("Unlike the
U.S. military, which prohibits drinking, Triple Canopy employees ran their own bar, called
the Gem, inside the Green Zone.").
105. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000). This general article criminalizes conduct such as
fraternization and adultery, and has "survived constitutional attacks premised on
vagueness or lack of notice that the particular conduct was unlawful." United States v.
Orellana, 62 M.J. 595, 599 (2005).
106. 10 U.S.C. § 885 (2000) (covering "[d]esertion" and applying to "[any member of
the armed forces" (emphasis added)).
107. Id. § 892 (covering "[flailure to obey order or regulation" and applying to "[a]ny
person subject to this chapter").
108. Id. § 925 ("Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal
copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex ... is guilty of sodomy.").
109. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that the "[petitioners'] right to liberty under the
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government" and that it is unconstitutional to "mak[e] ... private
sexual conduct a crime").
110. See Matthews, supra note 21.
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tool to take action' against violations that are serious enough to
damage U.S. national interests.... However, because the stated
purpose of all military law is "to strengthen the national security of
the United States,'' 1 2 the task of determining which laws should be
enforced is particularly difficult absent a bright-line rule. The value
achieved by enforcing each law must necessarily be balanced against
individual rights.
Some offenses that seem to hinder individual liberties may be
justifiably enforced to avoid jeopardizing the military's mission and
the needless loss of lives. For example, the general order prohibiting
alcohol consumption can have a major impact on a mission. The
purpose of this order is to "safeguard[] the image of U.S. forces, and
to promot[e] the legitimacy of the host government.""' In a
counterinsurgency operation, "[r]egaining the populace's active and
continued support for the [host-nation] government is essential to
deprive an insurgency of its power and appeal.""' 4 Therefore, the
prohibition against alcohol serves an important role in the
government's efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. An incident that
occurred in 2006 involving a Blackwater employee is illustrative of
this point. According to reports, "[t]he Blackwater guard had been
drinking heavily in the Green Zone.... tried to enter an area where
Iraqi officials live" and subsequently shot and killed an Iraqi
bodyguard.'15 Incidents like this ignite "Iraqi public opinion ' 16 and
are counterproductive to counterinsurgency efforts. Preventing
behavior that is counterproductive to the mission is a strong argument
in favor of enforcing military-specific laws.
Summing up the due process analysis of section 552, differences
between the federal and military criminal systems pose major hurdles
to the constitutionality of prosecuting civilians under the UCMJ. In
particular, jury composition for courts-martial and the existence of
military-specific offenses pose the greatest constitutional concerns.
111. William Matthews, Contractor Crackdown, ARMED FORCES J., Feb. 2007, at 10,
11 (emphasis added) (quoting Kevin Bishop, a spokesman for Senator Graham).
112. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES pmbl. para. 3 (2002).
113. COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 10, at 357; see also GENERAL
ORDER 1, supra note 104, at 1 ("Restrictions... are essential to fostering US/host nation
relations.
114. COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 10, at 54.
115. Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Contractor Banned by Iraq Over Shootings, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2007, at Al. While the actual crime here was murder, this incident reveals why
the military may have an interest in regulating alcohol consumption.
116. Ned Parker, U.S. Restricts Movement of Its Diplomats in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
19, 2007, at Al (reporting that "Iraqi public opinion [was] inflamed by the deaths"
resulting from the Blackwater shooting).
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However, in the framework established by Reid, due process is only
half the inquiry. After evaluating due process, the Reid Court next
considered the scope of Congress's authority to regulate the "land
and naval Forces" under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. "7 In
doing so, the Court indicated that there may be authority within the
Constitution allowing for UCMJ prosecution in certain
circumstances."8  While the plurality, concurrences, and dissent
analyzed and applied Article I, Section 8 differently to the facts in
Reid, dicta in each of the opinions appear to leave the door open for
constitutional prosecution of civilians under the UCMJ.
Looking first at the plurality opinion, Justice Black initially takes
a strong stand against any application of Congress's power of "land
and naval Forces" to civilians by declaring "if the language of Clause
14 is given its natural meaning, the power granted does not extend to
civilians."" 9 However, he subsequently qualifies this statement by
suggesting that "there might be circumstances where a person could
be 'in' the armed services for purposes of Clause 14 even though he
had not formally been inducted into the military or did not wear a
uniform." 2 ' According to Justice Black, the justification for such
circumstances "rest[s] on the government's 'war powers.' "121 He
acknowledges the fact that combat produces circumstances where
military commanders need broad control, and notes that such
circumstances have historically warranted military jurisdiction over
civilians.' These observations seem to directly apply to civilian
contractors participating in contingency operations and indicate that
the expanded jurisdiction of the UCMJ under section 552 could
indeed pass constitutional muster.
In their respective concurring opinions, Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan also raise points that seemingly leave the door open for
prosecution of civilian contractors under the UCMJ. Although
117. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 (1957) ("Article I, § 8, cl. 14 empowers Congress
'To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.' ").
118. See id. at 19 ("Since [the] court-martial did not meet the requirements of Art. III,
§ 2 or the Fifth and Sixth Amendments we are compelled to determine if there is anything
within the Constitution which authorizes the military trial of dependents accompanying
the armed forces overseas.").
119. Id. (footnotes omitted).
120. Id. at 23.
121. Id. at 33.
122. See id. (noting that "[i]n the face of an actively hostile enemy, military
commanders necessarily have broad power over persons on the battlefront" and that,
historically, "extraordinary circumstances present in an area of actual fighting have been
considered sufficient to permit punishment of some civilians in that area by military courts
under military rules" (footnote omitted)).
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Justice Frankfurter finds that applying the UCMJ to civilian spouses
is unconstitutional, he is emphatic in noting that his decision is
narrowly tailored to the specific facts of the case.'23 This limitation
leaves open the possibility that there may be other circumstances in
which civilians can constitutionally be subjected to the UCMJ. In
contrast, Justice Harlan's concurrence provides a straightforward
analysis of Congress's Article I, Section 8 authority. In his opinion,
the authority is broad.'24 In explaining why Congress's war powers
are necessarily wide sweeping, Justice Harlan quotes Alexander
Hamilton:
These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is
impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of
national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of
the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The
circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite,
and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be
imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.'25
The ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan fit the type of
situation that Justice Harlan had in mind when quoting Hamilton.
Modern operations are quite different from the "large main force
engagements that characterized conflict in World War II, Korea, and
Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom... [which] have become
the exceptions in American warfare.' ' 126 In concert with this change,
the government's use of civilian contractors has increased
dramatically in scope and magnitude. 27 Justice Harlan's concurrence
suggests that he would have no reservations about accepting the
constitutionality of section 552 if it were needed to give commanders
control over civilian contractors in contingency operations. His
position is extremely deferential to a commander's "power to prevent
activities which would jeopardize the security and effectiveness of his
command.' ' 28
123. See id. at 45 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("In making this adjudication, I must
emphasize that it is only the trial of civilian dependents ... in time of peace that is in
question.... I need not intimate any opinion on ... situations involving civilians, in the
sense of persons not having a military status, other than dependents.").
124. Id. at 68 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]here is no indication that any special
limitation on the power of Congress. . . was subsumed in the grant of power to govern the
land and naval forces.").
125. Id. at 68-69 (emphasis omitted).
126. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, COUNTERINSURGENCY
OPERATIONS, at vi (2004).
127. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
128. Reid, 354 U.S. at 72 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Finally, the dissenters in Reid also believed that Congress has
wide authority under Article I, Section 8. Justices Clark and Burton
willingly accepted UMCJ jurisdiction over civilians by concluding that
the statute authorizing jurisdiction was "reasonably related to the
power of Congress '[t]o make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.' "129 Since the dissenters
were able to accept jurisdiction over civilian spouses of service
members, 3 ' it follows that they would also accept section 552 as
constitutional.
Realistically, the only true indication of the constitutionality of
section 552 will involve a test case challenging the jurisdiction of the
UCMJ following a conviction of a civilian by a court-martial.'
However, the recent Hamdan v. Rumsfield 3 2 decision provides some
insight into the current Court's views of the military justice system.
In Hamdan, the majority noted that "federal courts should
respect the balance that Congress struck between military
preparedness and fairness to individual service members when it
created 'an integrated system of military courts and review
procedures.' "133 Although it refers to service members, this comment
shows deference to Congress's ability to balance individual rights
against military interests. As such, the current Court would likely
approach a constitutional challenge to section 552 understanding the
requirement for a disciplinary system and appreciating the
protections imbedded into the modern UCMJ.
In conclusion, the section 552 amendment to 10 U.S.C.
§ 802(a)(10) faces major constitutional barriers but may nonetheless
pass muster when applying the framework established in Reid.
Undoubtedly, despite major improvements to the UCMJ and the
greater rights it often affords, the remaining due process concerns
regarding jury composition and military-specific offenses are
extremely significant. Nevertheless, as dicta in Reid suggest,
Congress's power under Article I, Section 8 may warrant application
of the UCMJ in contingency operations. At the very least, it keeps
the door open. Unlike 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(11), which was found to be
129. Id. at 80 (Clark, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14).
130. Id. at 85 ("[T]he military commander who bears full responsibility for the care and
safety of those civilians attached to his command should also have authority to regulate
their conduct.").
131. See Singer, supra note 19 ("[P]redicting what the Supreme Court may or may not
rule seems a lot like predicting the lottery. We won't know until there is a test case.").
132. 548 U.S. -, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
133. Id. at -, 126 S. Ct. at 2770 (quoting Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758
(1975)).
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unconstitutional in Reid, the amendment to § 802(a)(10) is narrowly
focused on declared wars and contingency operations, which fall
under Congress's Article I, Section 8 authority. If the power to
subject civilians accompanying the force to the UCMJ was inherent in
Congress's authority to declare war prior to section 552, then it
follows that Congress should be able to subject civilians to the UCMJ
in war-like contingency operations without having to actually declare
war. Section 552 aims to do just that.
Finally, it is important to note that just because section 552 may
be found constitutional, that does not necessarily make it the best or
only solution to contractor accountability. There are many practical
obstacles to implementing section 552. As one Judge Advocate
explains:
[S]ubjecting contractor personnel to the UCMJ during all
contingency operations appears to constitute a significant
change rather than a clarification. No legislative history
explains this change. Further, as there is no published
guidance, it is unclear how this change will be implemented and
precisely what the ramifications will be.134
Notably, Senator Graham's amendment was not solicited by the
Department of Defense. In fact, the very concept of subjecting
civilians to UCMJ authority in contingency operations was proposed
by Congress more than ten years ago and rejected by the Department
of Defense.135 However, notwithstanding the practical concerns
134. Mark A. Ries, Contractors Accompanying the Force, ARMY LAW., Jan. 2007, at
161, 161. As of the time of publication, the Secretary of Defense had just issued a
memorandum providing general guidance on the implementation of section 552. See
SEC'Y OF DEF., MEMORANDUM ON UCMJ JURISDICTION OVER DOD CIVILIAN
EMPLOYEES, DOD CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL, AND OTHER PERSONS SERVING WITH OR
ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED FORCES OVERSEAS DURING DECLARED WAR AND IN
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 1-3 (2008). However, this guidance is limited to general
principles regarding section 552's application and does not provide specific instructions for
prosecuting civilians under the UCMJ. See id.
135. In 1996, Congress established an advisory committee comprised of experts in
"military law, international law, and Federal civilian criminal law" to make
"recommendations concerning the advisability and feasibility of establishing United States
criminal law jurisdiction [in situations other than declared wars]." National Defense
Authorization Act for 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1151, 110 Stat. 186, 467-68. One of the
proposals made by the advisory committee was to expand UCMJ jurisdiction to cover
civilians in contingency operations. See Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 1999:
Hearing on H.R. 3380 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. 30 (2000) (statement of Robert E. Reed, Associate Deputy General Counsel,
United States Department of Defense). This recommendation was rejected by the
Department of Defense. See id. at 31. Interestingly, Senator Graham was present at the
hearings at which the proposal was rejected. See id. at 2. However, these events predated
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raised by section 552, Senator Graham's concern over the lack of
legal accountability for contractors in contingency operations is
justified. Events such as the Triple Canopy taxi shooting illustrate the
need for contractor accountability. 3 6 Senator Graham acted quickly
to fill a major deficiency in the justice system when he added section
552 to the FY07 NDAA. Subsequent legislation, including an
amendment to MEJA in the Transparency and Accountability in
Security Contracting Act of 2007, has been proposed but not yet
enacted despite a pressing need.'37 Regardless of whether section 552
is used or a new law is implemented to hold contractors accountable,
one thing is clear: whereas contingency operations may fall in a gray
area between war and peace, the legal status of contractors serving in
them should not.
CARA-ANN M. HAMAGUCHI
the Global War on Terrorism, and the extent of the present utilization of civilian
contractors in contingency operations was not fully appreciated at the time.
136. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
137. See Transparency and Accountability in Security Contracting Act of 2007, H.R.
369, 110th Cong. (2007). This Act clarifies MEJA's jurisdiction over individuals, "while
employed under a contract... awarded by any department or agency of the United States
Government, where the work under such contract is carried out in a region outside the
United States in which the Armed Forces are conducting a contingency operation." Id.
§ 4(a). It also establishes an FBI Theater Investigative Unit which would be "responsible
for investigating allegations of criminal misconduct." Id. § 5(a). Finally, it leaves section
552 intact, but requires the Secretary of Defense to issue guidance on how it will be
implemented. Id. § 4(b).
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